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Liability within company groups
RICHARD STEVENS* 
1 Introduction
In Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon
1
 the court held that the law does not involve itself 
with economics but with the law. This view was confirmed by the English appeal 
court in Adams v Cape Industries plc.
2
 These views were expressed within the 
context of company groups and the possibility of holding companies liable for the 
acts of a subsidiary. However, company groups are commercial realities. The law, 
however, in many respects does not give effect to this commercial reality but instead 
still has as its point of departure the doctrines of separate juristic personality and 
limited liability. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough 
Council, Bronze Investments Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council and 
DHN Food Transport Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council
3
 the relevant 
court recognised the economic reality of the group, but this view was rejected in the 
Adams case. 
South African law also follows the separate juristic personality doctrine as its 
point of departure. Locke4 convincingly argues that the supreme court of appeal in 
Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Mobile Telephone Networks 
(Pty) Ltd
5
 watered down the separate juristic personality doctrine in this specific 
matter within the context of a group of companies and the relevant provisions of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.6 Locke argues that the separate juristic personality of the 
individual companies within the relevant group of companies was relaxed not on the 
basis of piercing of the corporate veil, but on the basis of a (commercially) purposive 
interpretation of statutes.7 
If one accepts that company groups are commercial realities, it could quite easily 
be accepted that the board of directors of the holding company will give instructions 
to the (board of the) subsidiary company which may at face value be detrimental 
to the subsidiary company. This begs the question of who will be exposed to 
liability to the subsidiary company where the subsidiary suffers damages due to the 
instructions which the holding company issued to its representatives on the board 
of the subsidiary. If one ignores the possibility of joint and several liability, two 
possible wrongdoers could be identified, and therefore, two possibilities could exist 
for the subsidiary to recover damages from. In the first instance, the more obvious 
possibility would be to hold the directors of the subsidiary company liable for breach 
*  Senior lecturer in Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University. I wish to thank Philip de Beer for 
his valuable comments. I also acknowledge the funding by the DAAD without whose financial 
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1 1987 AC 45.
2 1990 Ch 433.
3 1976 1 WLR 852.
4 Locke “The approach of the supreme court of appeal to the enterprise reality in company groups” 
2012 Stell LR 476.
5 2010 3 SA 382 (SCA).
6 s 26 and 33 respectively.
7 Locke (n 4) 477 485-489.
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of their fiduciary duty for not acting in the best interest of the company when they 
followed the instructions of the holding company. The less obvious possibility in 
terms of current South African company law would be to hold the holding company 
liable for the damages which the subsidiary suffered due to the instructions which 
the holding company issued to the board of the subsidiary.
This article will therefore explore these two opposing possibilities for liability 
and the possible success of each within the current company law framework in 
South Africa. A comparative study will be done with German law which provides 
for liability for the holding company in the given situation. In respect of the position 
of the directors of the subsidiary, the provisions of the relevant company law 
legislation in Australia and New Zealand will also be considered. This article will 
have a narrow focus in respect of the relevant fiduciary duties of the directors of the 
subsidiary company and will not look at the provisions of section 76(2)(a)(ii) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the act). Instead the focus will be more on the duty to 
act in the best interest of the company and specifically to act independently and not 
at the behest of one’s appointer. 
This article will firstly focus on the possible liability of the holding company by 
considering the German law as well as considering the concept of shadow directors 
in the South African law. The article will then investigate the relevant fiduciary 
duties of the directors of the subsidiary and any possible defences which they may 
raise against allegations that they were in breach of their fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interest of the subsidiary company.
2 Holding company liability
2.1 The German Aktiengesetz
The discussion of the German law in respect of the possible liability of the holding 
company is largely based on the doctoral dissertation of Stevens.8
Different acts regulate different companies in German company law. In some 
cases there may be some overlapping where the courts have taken principles from 
the Aktiengesetz (“AG”) and applied them to the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung (“GmbH”). 
Section 308 of the AG allows a holding company to give instructions to the 
subsidiary company, even if they are detrimental to the subsidiary company, as long 
as there is a domination agreement (Beherrschungsvertrag) in terms of section 291 
of the AG. The controlling company is entitled to give directions to the dependent 
company if a domination agreement is in place.9 These directions may also be 
prejudicial to the dependent company in the absence of a contrary provision in the 
enterprise agreement. As long as these directions are to the benefit of the controlling 
company or other companies within the group, the dependent company has to 
comply with these directions. The board of the dependent company may not refuse 
to follow the directions of the controlling company because they believe that the 
directions are not to the benefit of the controlling company or of other companies 
within the group structure.10
8 Stevens The External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law: A Critical Comparative 
Analysis (2011 dissertation Stellenbosch) 112-137.
9 Altmeppen in Kropff and Semler Münchener Kommentar Aktiengesetz (2006) 781.
10 s 308(1) and s 308(2).
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2016 . 4
LIABILITY WITHIN COMPANY GROUPS 711
In the absence of a domination agreement, the AG provides that the holding 
company may not issue directives to the dependent subsidiary to engage in 
activities detrimental to its business or to take any business decisions which would 
be detrimental to the subsidiary, unless the detriment is remedied by the holding 
company.11 If the detriment is not remedied during the financial year in which it 
was caused it has to be made good at the end of that financial year. Should this not 
be done the subsidiary will have a claim for the harm that it suffered against the 
holding company.12 But what does harm mean?
The German Bundesgerichtshof, in the MPS case,13 had to decide whether there 
was any liability for the holding company or the directors of the holding company in 
terms of sections 311 and 217, 318 of the AG. In this case the subsidiary lent money 
to the holding company without obtaining security. 
The loan was for an indefinite period and the holding company was solvent and 
liquid at the time of the loan. The holding company for a few years paid off the 
loan including interest to the subsidiary. The subsidiary went insolvent and the 
liquidator attempted to recover the harm/damages from the holding company, MPS. 
The question before the court was whether there was any harm for the subsidiary 
by following the directives of the holding company to provide the loan on the given 
terms and without a date of termination of the agreement. However, the loan could 
also be cancelled on one month’s notice by the subsidiary. 
The court first of all considered what “harm” would mean in the context of the 
case and section 311 of the AG. It stated that harm meant “any reduction or concrete 
endangerment of the financial standing (assets and liabilities) and the profitability 
(income) position of the company without consideration of how / in so far as to 
quantify / the quantifiability of the stated impairment/damage as a result of the 
dependency.”14 As mentioned before, section 311 of the AG has to be read with 
section 317 of the AG which provides that if the holding company does not make 
good the harm suffered by the subsidiary company, that the holding company and 
its management board will be jointly and severally liable for damages which the 
subsidiary suffered. 
2.2  Defence available to the holding company and its board of directors and 
interpretive difficulties
The holding company is, however, relieved of this duty to make good any damages 
to the subsidiary company if a reasonable and diligent15 business manager of an 
independent company would have undertaken the same business or issued the same 
business decisions.16 
The statutory agents, ie the directors of the holding company, are also jointly 
liable with the holding company for the envisaged damages.17 The board of directors 
can also be held liable, over and above the liability envisaged in section 317 of the 
11 s 311(1) and Emmerich and Habersack Aktien- und GmbH-Konzernrecht (2003) 501-504. 
12 s 311(2).
13 BGHZ II ZR 102/07 01-12-2008.
14 BGHZ II ZR 102/07 8: “Jede Minderung oder konkrete Gefährdung der Vermögens- und Ertragslage 
der Gesellschaft ohne Rücksicht auf Quantifizierbarkeit, soweit die genannte Beeinträchtigung als 
Abhängigkeitsfolge eintritt.” 
15 ordentlicher und gewissenhafter.
16 s 317(2).
17 s 317(3). According to Emmerich and Habersack (n 11) the statutory agent is the agent of the holding 
company who is responsible for the management of a company, usually the board of directors (594).
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AG, for the failure of the holding company to remedy the detrimental directives 
which it issued to the subsidiary company by the end of the financial year. Like the 
holding company, the board of directors has a defence in the form of the reasonable 
and diligent business manager defence.18 This means that if a reasonable and diligent 
business manager would have acted in the same way there will be no liability. The 
burden of proof is on the board of directors to show that they acted as reasonable 
and diligent business managers.19 The supervisory board of directors is also liable 
if it firstly fails to consider the report of the auditor in respect of the detrimental 
business relations between the holding company and the subsidiary company, and if 
it secondly fails to report the conclusions of the auditor’s report to the shareholders 
meeting.20
Kropff highlights a number of problems with the relevant provisions. The first 
problem is that it may be difficult to establish whether a specific business decision 
or transaction stemmed from a directive of the holding company or whether the 
decision was made by the board of directors of the subsidiary company.21 The 
nature of a group of companies is such that some of the directors will often serve 
simultaneously on the boards of several companies within the group. Even if there 
are no directors in common on the boards of the holding company and the subsidiary 
company, it could still be difficult to determine whether the subsidiary acted at the 
behest of the holding company. It is easily conceivable that the subsidiary company 
may, on its own initiative, engage in activities to promote the interests of the group 
independently, despite the detriment to itself. The nature of a group of companies is 
furthermore such that cooperation between the various companies is inevitable in 
respect of planning, production, information technology and the like.22 Furthermore, 
the information to determine whether a harmful business decision was due to the 
directives of the holding company falls within the knowledge of the management 
of the holding company and the subsidiary company. It may be difficult for the 
minority to provide the requisite proof that the subsidiary company acted at the 
behest of the holding company.23
The second problem according to Kropff is the determination of what qualifies 
as a detrimental transaction or decision.24 The German legislature addresses this 
question by providing that one should ask whether a reasonable and diligent25 
business manager of an independent company would have undertaken the same 
business transaction or made the same business decision under the circumstances.26 
It can also be asked whether there must be damages for the protective measures to 
become operative. The logical answer would probably be that the holding company 
would only have to indemnify the subsidiary company should the latter suffer 
loss due to the directives of the holding company. Kropff argues that there can be 
harm or detriment without damages being suffered. He provides the example of a 
subsidiary company which engages in a risky venture which necessitates a higher 
quid pro quo. Even if there is an eventual advantage to the subsidiary company it 
18 s 317(2).
19 s 318(1).
20 s 318(2) read with s 314.
21 Altmeppen (n 9) 772.
22 Altmeppen (n 9) 772.
23 Antunes Liability of Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships 
in US, German and EU Law: An International and Comparative Perspective (1994) 348.
24 Altmeppen (n 9) 772.
25 ordentlicher und gewissenhafter.
26 s 317(2) of the Aktiengesetz. See also the MPS case (n 13).
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2016 . 4
LIABILITY WITHIN COMPANY GROUPS 713
was a detrimental transaction when it was entered into. If the subsidiary company 
acted at the behest of the holding company the provisions of the Aktiengesetz would 
become operative.27
Antunes28 identifies the quantification of the harm which the subsidiary company 
suffered due to the directives of the holding company as problematic. The first issue 
again concerns how the management of an independent company would have acted 
under those circumstances. Would they have entered into the transaction? If so, 
would it have been on the same terms, with the same contracting party and at the 
same price?29 What if the answer to some of the questions is “yes” and “no” to 
others? Is there still liability? Can a person determine a causal link between the 
specific offending term which the management of an independent company would 
not have accepted and the eventual harm that was suffered? The quantification of 
damages could in some circumstances be easy but in other cases very difficult. In 
a situation like the one under discussion the added problem lies in determining 
whether the management of an independent company would have acted differently. 
Once that complex question is determined, the extent of the loss has to be proved. 
This can make the whole exercise very complicated and difficult for minority 
shareholders or creditors of the subsidiary company, with the added complication of 
a lack of information. 
2.3 Conclusion
The main principle to distil from the AG is probably that there is an attempt by the 
German legislature to ensure the independence of the subsidiary. It also attempts 
to prevent the holding company or its board from exercising undue pressure on the 
subsidiary to engage in risky behaviour. The punishment of having to make good 
any harm, or, in the absence thereof, to be liable for damages, seems to be adequate 
protection for the subsidiary company. Problematic, however, are the following: 
what harm is and how harm is to be determined; and when the harm has to be made 
good, especially in longer-term contracts where there is no harm in the first few 
years of the contract as was the case in the MPS decision? 
The principles from the relevant provisions of the AG, however, appear to be 
sound. The German legislature allows the holding company to give instructions 
to the subsidiary, even if they are to the detriment of the subsidiary company on 
condition that a domination agreement is in place. If there is none, the holding 
company may not issue detrimental instructions. If it does, it has to make good the 
harm that the subsidiary suffers and if it does not, it and its directors are liable for 
the damages suffered by the subsidiary. 
The question which arises within the South African context is whether the current 
law provides for any possibilities akin to the German provisions. In this respect the 
issue of piercing the corporate veil will not be addressed. Instead the focus will be 
on whether it could be argued that the holding company acted as a shadow director 
of the subsidiary and on that basis would have the same fiduciary duties as the 
directors of the subsidiary company. 
27 Altmeppen (n 9) 827 and see also Antunes (n 23) 352.
28 Antunes (n 23) 353.
29 Antunes (n 23) 353.
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2.4 The position of shadow directors and nominee directors
In respect of shadow directors the question will be posed whether the holding 
company could be considered to be a shadow director of the subsidiary company 
and would thus be covered by the fiduciary duties of directors. 
The UK Companies Act 2006 (“the UK act”) defines shadow directors as follows 
in section 251:
“(1) In the Companies Acts “shadow director”, in relation to a company, means a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to 
act.
(2) A person is not to be regarded as a shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice 
given by him in a professional capacity.
(3) A body corporate is not to be regarded as a shadow director of any of its subsidiary companies 
for the purposes of—
Chapter 2 (general duties of directors),
Chapter 4 (transactions requiring members’ approval), or
Chapter 6 (contract with sole member who is also a director),
by reason only that the directors of the subsidiary are accustomed to act in accordance with its 
directions or instructions.”
Does a shadow director differ from a de facto director? A de facto director is a 
person who acts as a director but who is not formally appointed as a director.30 In 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland; Re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd31 the 
question which the court had to answer was whether Holland was a de facto director 
of 42 companies which the revenue service alleged were associated companies for 
revenue purposes. If Holland was indeed a de facto director of all the companies, 
it would have had an impact on possible liability in terms of the applicable tax 
legislation, insolvency legislation and the UK Companies Act. The revenue service 
did not argue that Holland was a shadow director because the insolvency act did 
not provide for a remedy against a shadow director, but it did provide a remedy 
against an officer of the company.32 It must be borne in mind that the case was still 
also decided in terms of the 1986 Companies Act which allowed a company to be 
a director of another company subject to certain conditions. In this case the sole 
director of the 42 companies was a company of which Mr and Mrs Holland were the 
sole directors. Lord Collins held that the test to determine whether a person was a de 
facto director and the test whether a person was a shadow director could overlap with 
each other. The two tests were therefore not mutually exclusive. A shadow director 
was essentially not held by the company to be a director and remains mainly out of 
sight and in the background, whereas the de facto director is held in most cases to 
be a director and he also tends to act as if he is one.33 
The act prohibits a juristic person from being a director.34 This would include 
acting as de facto director. The mere fact that a juristic person may not act as a 
director in terms of the act does not however mean that it factually cannot act as 
such. Whether it is possible to argue that the holding company acts as a shadow 
director is a difficult issue. As an analogy one could use the liability in terms of 
30 Cassim, Cassim, Cassim, Jooste, Shev and Yeats Contemporary Company Law (2012) 408-409.
31 2010 UKSC 51.
32 s 212 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986.
33 See Keay Directors’ Duties (2014) 21 § 2.33. It must also be borne in mind that s 155(1) of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 provides that at least one director has to be a natural person.
34 s 69(7)(a).
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section 424 of the 1973 Companies Act, where it was provided that any person 
who knowingly conducts the business of the company recklessly, or was party to 
the reckless conduct of business, could be held liable. The question could be posed 
whether the holding company could be “a person” which could knowingly be a 
party to the subsidiary conducting its business recklessly as well. 
The question therefore arises whether a holding company could knowingly be 
a party to the reckless conduct of business by its subsidiary, especially in a case 
where the latter company incurs debt at a stage when it is technically insolvent. The 
requirement of “knowingly” should be easily ascertainable in those cases where the 
same directors of the holding company sit on the board of the subsidiary. In light 
of the fact that the holding company is the sole or majority shareholder it would be 
extremely rare for these directors not to be aware of the financial situation of the 
subsidiary or the manner in which the business of the subsidiary is being conducted. 
The greater its shareholding in the subsidiary and the smaller the group, the more 
easily the holding company will satisfy the “knowingly” test. 
The more problematic aspect may be the “party to the reckless conduct of 
business” test. Mere awareness of the reckless conduct of business would probably 
not suffice: it would have to be shown that the holding company was party to the 
reckless conduct of business. It is submitted that some form of participation in the 
conduct of the business of the subsidiary may be required. In Powertech Industries 
Ltd v Mayberry
35
 the court held that in order to hold the auditor of the relevant 
company liable it had to be shown that:
“To be a ‘party’ to the conduct of a company’s business requires an association with it in a common 
pursuit. That is the ordinary meaning of the word as it is used in the statute. … A ‘party’ to the 
carrying on of a company’s business is one who has joined with the company in a common pursuit. 
Generally this would include its directors and managers, all of whom are acting in common pursuit 
of the company’s business ... The section does not extend to those who, while carrying on their own 
business, incidentally enable the company to carry on its business.”36
On the basis of this statement of the court in the Powertech case, a plausible case 
may be instituted against the holding company since inevitably there would be a 
common pursuit. The concept of directing minds may be important here since the 
holding company will inevitably appoint the majority, if not all, of the directors of 
the subsidiary company. Can the actions of the directors, appointed by the holding 
company, be the actions of the holding company? Are the directors who serve on the 
board of the subsidiary the directing minds of the holding company?
In Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd37 the house of lords 
held that:
“[A] corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; 
its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person or somebody who for some 
purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, 
the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation.”38
The “directing mind” doctrine is therefore in essence there to attribute the acts 
and the mental state of the persons who control a company to that company.39 This 
35 1996 2 SA 742 (W).
36 749D-G.
37 1915 AC 705, 1914-1915 All ER 280 (HL).
38 283.
39 Blackman, Jooste and Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act (RS 4 2007) 4-123.
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doctrine of the directing mind is not limited to criminal liability but also applies to 
delictual liability.40 The question therefore is whether the holding company is the 
directing mind of the subsidiary. An argument could certainly be made that the 
holding company directs the operations of the subsidiary. It is submitted, however, 
that a blanket statement to this effect cannot be made. The mere fact that the holding 
company may appoint all or the majority of the directors of its subsidiary could 
imply that the directors who are appointed are the directing minds of the holding 
company itself, at least in those cases where the directors are the sole shareholders of 
the holding company. In cases where they are not in control of the holding company 
and they are appointed by the holding company, the argument may still be made 
that the holding company is the directing mind of the subsidiary.41 However, this 
could become a “chicken and egg” argument. It would also be plausible to argue 
that the directors of the holding company direct and make decisions for the holding 
company and that they make the decisions for the holding company, and that it is 
not the company which is the directing mind of the subsidiary but the directors of 
the holding company.
When one considers the Holland case in respect of shadow directors, it is clear 
that where a company could have a corporate director the court would not easily 
read into this that the natural persons controlling the corporate director would 
necessarily be held to be de facto directors of the company. It could then also be 
argued that the corporate director would be the directing mind of the company. By 
analogy where a shadow director is not allowed in law, the point of departure should 
therefore be that a corporate person should be viewed to be the directing mind of the 
company only in exceptional cases. The question in such an instance would be who 
the directing minds are. The only possible answers would be either the board of the 
subsidiary company, or the board of the holding company. 
In light of the above discussion it is doubtful that the holding company could 
incur liability for any harm suffered by the subsidiary unless it is done on the basis 
of veil piercing. Any German-style liability would therefore have to be legislated 
for. In the next part the liability of the directors of the subsidiary company will be 
discussed in the context of following instructions which were issued to them by the 
holding company as controlling shareholder. 
3 Liability of nominee directors on the board of the subsidiary
3.1 The position of nominee directors
In S v De Jager
42 the court referred to the concepts “nominee”, “tool”, “stooge” and 
“dummy” as synonymous. In S v Shaban,43 Hiemstra J said in respect of “puppet” 
directors within the context on a fraud being perpetrated on the Registrar of 
Insurance, essentially consisting of pretending that one company was independent 
from another:
“A nominee is a lawfully elected director, put on the board by a shareholder who controls sufficient 
voting power for the purpose. He goes to a meeting and acts in the way his principal wants him to 
... The Companies Act knows directors and through practice the concept of nominees has arisen, 
but they are still lawfully elected directors whose functions as such are not a hollow pretence. Our 
40 4-123.
41 See also Intramed (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2005 1 All SA 460 (W).
42 1965 2 SA 616 (A). 
43 1965 4 SA 646 (W).
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law does not know the complete puppet who pretends to take part in the management of a company 
whilst having no idea what it is to which he puts his signature. It is utterly foreign to the basic 
concepts of our law and the courts will punish it as fraud.”44
The court clearly here distinguishes the nominee director from a puppet. A puppet is 
a mere facade, whereas a nominee director is apparently a proper director. However, 
the court strangely mentioned the term “complete puppet”, which seems to indicate 
that there could be a difference between a “puppet” and a “complete puppet”. As 
Du Plessis45 correctly points out, the formulation of the court of what a nominee 
director is, is not correct.
A director owes a duty to act in the interest of his company and not in the 
interest of his appointer.46 With reference to the Shaban case, the De Jager case and 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,47 Du Plessis asked whether 
it would be possible to hold nominators personally liable in law. In the first two 
cases the nominators were criminally prosecuted for fraud, and Du Plessis also 
acknowledges that the Robinson case was an extreme case of manipulation.48 With 
reference to company groups he also acknowledged that it would be difficult to take 
action against the nominator, since the holding company would be in control of the 
board of the subsidiary and the board of the holding company could be the same as 
the subsidiary board.49 In his article Du Plessis argued for the liability of nominators 
of directors, especially in the context of the group situation, but also acknowledged 
the difficulty in achieving this, even if one used the concept of a shadow director.50 
Since the article by Du Plessis, the question is whether we are any closer to imposing 
liability on the nominator. 
The untenable situation could arise where a director acted in the interest of the 
holding company (of which he is also a director), but to the detriment of the subsidiary 
of which he is also a director. When the holding company gives instructions to 
the subsidiary company, it effectively gives the instructions to the board of the 
subsidiary to decide and implement the instructions. The holding company, in terms 
of section 3 of the act, will naturally control the board of the subsidiary and have 
“nominee” directors in place.
How do foreign jurisdictions deal with issues like nominee directors on the 
boards of subsidiary companies? The ancillary question is to what extent directors 
on the subsidiary board may fetter their discretion, especially in the context of the 
holding company subsidiary company relationship. Oddly, the duty of a director to 
exercise his discretion in an unfettered manner has not been explicitly inserted into 
section 76 of the act. The closest would probably be section 76(3)(b), which provides 
that a director must act in the best interest of the company.51
Keay mentions that the duty to act in an unfettered manner is breached even if the 
director had no intention of benefiting from the agreement with the other party to 
whom he bound himself.52 There has been some movement away from the common 
44 651F-652A.
45 Du Plessis “Nominee directors versus puppet, dummy and stooge directors: reflections on these 
directors and their nominators or appointers” 1995 TSAR 310.
46 Du Plessis (n 45) 312.
47 1921 AD 168.
48 Du Plessis (n 45) 314-315.
49 Du Plessis (n 45) 315.
50 Du Plessis (n 45) 319-321. 
51 Cassim et al (n 30) 529.
52 Keay (n 33) 184-185.
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law position abroad. Whether these are merely exceptions to the facts at hand or 
whether the judiciary is actively moving away from a strict interpretation is difficult 
to gauge. In Thorby v Goldberg53 the directors of a company sought to declare a 
contract void for illegality based on the fact that the contract contained a provision 
in terms of which they bound themselves to exercise their discretion in a certain 
manner in the future. The case should however be treated with circumspection. 
Kitto J said the following:
“There are many kinds of transactions in which the proper time for the exercise of the directors’ 
discretion is the time of the negotiation of a contract, and not the time at which the contract is to 
be performed. A sale of land is a familiar example. Where all the members of a company desire to 
enter as a group into a transaction such as that in the present case, the transaction being one which 
requires action by the board of directors for its effectuation, it seems to me that the proper time 
for the directors to decide whether their proposed action will be in the interests of the company as 
a whole is the time when the transaction is being entered into, and not the time when their action 
under it is required. If at the former time they are bona fide of opinion that it is in the interests of 
the company that the transaction should be entered into and carried into effect, I see no reason in 
law why they should not bind themselves to do whatever under the transaction is to be done by the 
board.54 
Menzies J stated the following in respect of the facts:
“While I wish to guard against being understood as deciding that a director of a company can in an 
ordinary case bind himself to exercise his power as a director in a particular way, I have not in this 
case found any ground for objection to the directors of the company committing themselves, as I 
think they did, to act as set out in the agreement …. All the shareholders were party to the agreement 
and what the directors undertook to do was what all the shareholders committed themselves to 
ensure that they did.”55
And finally Owen J stated: 
“For all that appears from the plea, the directors of the Company may, before the execution of the 
agreement, have given proper consideration to the desirability of entering into it and decided that it 
was in the best interests of the Company that it should be made. If so, it would be impossible to argue 
that they had, by executing the document, improperly fettered the future exercise of their discretion. 
In fact they would already have exercised it and, in the absence of an allegation that they had done 
so improperly, the suggested defence could not be sustained.”56
It would appear, especially after considering the example that Kitto J gave, that 
directors may determine how they will decide on a matter in the future, but that 
they should have exercised their discretions independently when making this 
determination. Imagine that the directors enter into a contract of sale for land 
on a certain date and this agreement is beneficial for the company at that date. 
The directors will then also in this contract give an undertaking that they will do 
everything to effect transfer at the relevant time in the future. The contract then 
becomes disadvantageous to the company between the date of signing the contract 
and the date of transfer. The directors at the date of transfer now allege that they 
have fettered their discretions when they signed the contract of sale and allege that 
the contract is therefore unlawful. This is certainly not possible, since the directors 
53 1964 112 CLR 597.
54 605-606.
55 610.
56 617-618.
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at the date of signing the contract of sale already applied their independent minds 
to the agreement and the fettering of their future conduct was merely a logical 
consequence of the agreement. It is also important to bear in mind, when looking 
at the words of Menzies J, that all the shareholders were aware of the agreement 
and were also signatories to the agreement. The shareholders therefore consented to 
the possibility of the directors fettering their discretion in respect of a very specific 
matter. There was therefore no undertaking to vote in a certain way in respect of 
uncertain matters or upon the instructions of a certain individual. 
In Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc
57 the underlying issue was the 
development of Craven Cottage, which served as the home of Fulham Football 
Club. The club leased the property from its ultimate holding company, Vicenza via 
Cabra Estates, which was the subsidiary of Vicenza. Vicenza wanted to develop the 
property. The local council opposed the development and submitted an alternative 
development and issued a compulsory purchase order. Initially the directors of 
Fulham supported the local council but prior to the public inquiry in respect of 
the compulsory purchase order, the directors of Fulham contractually undertook 
to support the appeal of Vicenza against the compulsory purchase order and 
simultaneously support the application by Vicenza for the development of Craven 
Cottage. The relevant authority rejected the compulsory purchase order but also 
rejected Vicenza’s appeal. Subsequent to this public inquiry, Vicenza lodged a new 
planning application and a public inquiry had to be held. At this stage the directors 
of Fulham changed their minds and held the belief that the development would 
not be in the best interest of Fulham. Vicenza informed Fulham of the new public 
inquiry and that it was required to write a letter of support of the development. The 
directors of Fulham alleged that the undertaking to support the application was a 
breach of their fiduciary duty not to fetter their discretion. The court dealt with a 
number of issues, including an interpretation of the undertaking by the directors 
ie whether the undertaking, although for seven years, was only in respect of the 
initial compulsory purchase order and appeal by Vicenza or whether it extended 
to any new application to develop Craven Cottage. The crucial issue was however 
the undertaking where the directors did not only rely on a breach of their fiduciary 
duties but also on legislation which, inter alia, prohibited giving false evidence 
amongst others. 
The court in the Fulham case rejected the arguments by the directors of Fulham. 
Although the court acknowledged that directors should act in good faith and in 
the best interest of the company, this did not necessarily mean that they could not 
contractually bind themselves to the future exercise of their discretions. The effect 
of not allowing such a contractual undertaking would be that a company could lose 
out on a commercially beneficial contract. Neill LJ referred with approval to the 
Australian case of Thorby v Goldberg and rejected two English cases, John Crowther 
Group plc v Carpets International plc,58 and Rackham v Peek Foods Ltd,59where the 
respective courts held that such undertakings were unlawful. Neill LJ mentioned 
that neither case referred to the Thorby case and that they should be understood 
within the specific factual context. According to the court in the Fulham case, the 
cases did not lay down a general rule that directors can never give an undertaking in 
respect of the future exercise of their fiduciary powers.60 
57 1994 1 BCLC 363; 1992 BCC 863.
58 1990 BCLC 460.
59 1990 BCLC 895.
60 the Fulham case (n 57) par 393.
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Both the Thorby and the Fulham cases dealt with contractual undertakings in 
respect of the future exercise of fiduciary powers by the directors of the respective 
companies. Blackman argues that the Thorby case was incorrectly decided because 
the court confused the personal undertaking of the directors with the transaction 
entered into on behalf of the company. The time that the contract is entered into 
is crucial according to Blackman; ie that would be the time to determine whether 
the directors believe that they are acting in the best interest of the company.61 
More difficult, however, is the position of nominee directors where the manner of 
exercising their discretion would be less overt and probably more implied due to 
their relationship with their appointers. The appointees will probably feel under 
the moral obligation and compelled to exercise their discretions in favour of their 
appointers. This is especially the case in the relationship between the holding 
company and its subsidiary where the holding company would be able to appoint 
the majority of the board.
The English law appears to be settled that nominee directors have to act in 
good faith and in the best interest of their own companies.62 In New Zealand the 
position appears to be more flexible. In Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd v Fernyhough,63 an 
Australian company held only 40% of the shares in the New Zealand company but 
could appoint three of the six directors. There was no provision in the articles for 
a casting vote. The New Zealand company started competing with the Australian 
company and among other things also denied the three Australian directors access 
to the premises and books of the New Zealand company. The Australian directors 
and company sought an interdict to compel the company to provide access to the 
Australian directors. The New Zealand company alleged, or were fearful, that the 
Australian directors would gain access to confidential information which they 
would share with their nominating company.
The court held that the situation which arose was more of a partnership than 
a proper company. For example, the Australian company was entitled to a 40% 
dividend of the annual profit after tax. The court then stated:
“Notwithstanding that the Australian directors are the nominees of the Australian company, they 
nevertheless have responsibilities to the whole body of shareholders. But despite the width of that 
proposition, there have been attempts to bring this theoretical doctrine of undivided responsibility 
into harmony with commercial reality, upon the basis that when articles are agreed upon whereby 
a specified shareholder or group of shareholders is empowered to nominate its own directors, then 
there may be grounds for saying that in addition to the responsibility which such directors have to all 
shareholders as represented by the corporate entity, they may have a special responsibility towards 
those who nominated them. Such a view proceeds on the basis that the articles were so constructed 
with the intent and belief that the institution of such a special responsibility towards one class 
of shareholders was conducive to the interests of the company as a whole. The stage has already 
been reached, according to some commentators, where nominee directors will be absolved from 
suggested breach of duty to the company merely because they act in furtherance of the interests of 
their appointors, provided that their conduct accords with a bona fide belief that the interests of the 
corporate entity are likewise being advanced.”64
61 Blackman et al (n 39) 2 OS 2002 8-110.
62 See Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer 1959 AC 324; Lindgren v LandP Estates 
Ltd 1968 Ch 572; Re Neath Rugby Ltd 2009 EWCA 291; Keay (n 33) 191 § 7.32.
63 1980 2 NZLR 150.
64 the Berlei Hestia case (n 63) par 54-56.
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The above quote should be understood within the context of the facts of the case. 
The facts indicated more a position of a partnership with a partnership agreement 
than a company with articles of association. Even then the articles of association 
conferred specific powers to the directors and the shareholders could not interfere. 
The deadlock that existed in this case could therefore not be broken by the 60% 
New Zealand shareholders since they bound themselves contractually (through the 
articles) to vest all the relevant powers for this case in the board of directors. 
In Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd,65 the Auckland high court confirmed the 
reasoning in the Berlei Hestia case. The court confirmed that commercial realities 
should be taken into account when assessing the fiduciary duties of nominee 
directors on the boards of the subsidiary company. The court also considered the 
Australian cases of Re Broadcasting Station 2GB66 and Levin v Clark,67 where 
the New South Wales courts twice confirmed that commercial realities would be 
taken into account in the determination of to whom the directors owed a duty. The 
Australian courts subsequently followed these two earlier decisions in Re News 
Corporation Ltd
68
 and Canwest Global Communications Corporation v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation.
69 The Auckland high court, with reference to the Berlei 
Hestia decision, stated:
“Mahon J referred to attempts to bring the theoretical doctrine of undivided responsibility into 
harmony with commercial reality on the basis that, when articles are agreed upon in which a 
specified shareholder is empowered to nominate its own directors, there may be grounds for saying 
that, in addition to the responsibility which such directors have to all shareholders as represented 
by the corporate entity, they may have a special responsibility towards those who nominated them.
 On the basis of these decisions, nominee directors need not necessarily approach company 
problems with an open mind and they may pursue their appointer’s interests provided that, in the 
event of a conflict, they prefer the interests of the company. In such circumstances the breadth of the 
fiduciary duty has been narrowed by agreement amongst the body of shareholders. In other words, 
the incorporaters have agreed upon an adjusted form of fiduciary obligation.”70
Although it appears that all these cases accept that a nominee director may put the 
interests of his nominator above the interests of the company of which he is a director, 
the cases should also be understood within their own contexts. In these cases the 
articles or the subsidiaries allowed for such a fettered discretion as mentioned in the 
above quote. Whether these cases necessarily set out a new legal position is doubtful 
and it could be argued that they were very facts-specific. 
Ahern
71 mentions that the concept of nominee directors is difficult to describe but 
when discussing the case law and the context of her article refers to the directors 
appointed either by controlling shareholders or other bodies to serve their interest. 
Ahern argues that there are three lines of cases which have developed in respect 
of the position of nominee directors and their fiduciary duties. She distinguishes 
the absolutist approach, the corporate primacy approach and the attenuated duty 
65 1995 2 NZLR 8.
66 1964-1965 NSWR 1648.
67 1962 NSWR 686.
68 1987 70 ALR 419.
69 1997 24 ACSR 405.
70 the Dairy Containers case (n 65) par 215.
71 Ahern “Nominee directors’ duty to promote the success of the company: commercial pragmatism 
and legal orthodoxy” 2011 Law Quarterly Review 118. See also generally Redmond “Nominee 
directors” 1987 University of New South Wales Law Journal 194.
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approach.72 Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Jorgensen73 
and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer74 would be examples of 
the absolutist approach in terms whereof the courts held that a director has a duty 
only towards the company of which he is a director to the exclusion of any interest of 
another, including his/her appointer.75 In the Fisheries Development case the court 
stated:
“The director’s duty is to observe the utmost good faith towards the company, and in discharging 
that duty he is required to exercise an independent judgment and to take decisions according to the 
best interests of the company as his principal. He may in fact be representing the interests of the 
person who nominated him, and he may even be the servant or agent of that person, but, in carrying 
out his duties and functions as a director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests of the company 
to the exclusion of the interests of any such nominator, employer or principal. He cannot therefore 
fetter his vote as a director, save in so far as there may be a contract for the board to vote in that way 
in the interests of the company, and, as a director, he cannot be subject to the control of any employer 
or principal other than the company.”76
The court therefore essentially states that the commercial reality that directors are 
appointed by others must yield to the strict rule that the duty to the company must 
be obeyed and not the interest or loyalty to the appointer.
According to Ahern the corporate primacy approach is an approach that attempts 
to reconcile, or at least recognise, that there could be conflicting interests at stake 
for a nominee director and that an act may serve both the interest of the appointer 
and the company. However, if there is conflict and the conflict between the two 
interests cannot be reconciled, the interest of the appointer must yield to the interests 
of the company.77 In Re News Corporation Ltd78 the court, with reference to Re 
Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd,79 stated: 
“As was pointed out in the Broadcasting Station case, it would make the position of a nominee or 
representative director an impossibility to require that he approach each company problem with a 
completely open mind. It is both realistic and not improper to expect that such directors will follow 
the interests of the company which appointed them, subject to the qualification that they will not 
so act if of the view that their acts would not be in the interests of the company as a whole. In my 
opinion, it may be assumed that the nominee directors of NTHL will act in such a way. Such an 
assumption does not, however, lead to the assumption they will act in breach of their fiduciary duty 
as directors.”80
The attenuated approach is based on a contractual premise, namely that the 
shareholders of the company may agree that directors may act in the interest of 
the appointer.81 The New Zealand case of Berlei Hestia, although not a holding 
company subsidiary company relationship, but essentially a joint venture, gave 
cognisance and recognition to the articles of association.82 In Re Neath Rugby Ltd; 
72 Ahern (n 71) 129-137.
73 1980 4 SA 156 (W).
74 (n 62).
75 Ahern (n 71) 129.
76 the Fisheries Development case (n 73) 163E-G.
77 Ahern (n 71) 131.
78 the News case (n 68).
79 the Broadcasting Station case (n 66).
80 the News case (n 68) 437.
81 Ahern (n 71) 133.
82 the Berlia Hestia case (n 63).
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Hawkes v Cuddy
83 Hawkes and Cuddy were both 50% shareholders of Neath. Cuddy 
was disqualified from acting as a director of Neath (for reasons not important to 
this case) and he appointed Mrs Cuddy as director and the 50% share was actually 
registered in her name. Neath and Swansea would together form a new club, 
Ospreys. Neath and Swansea would each hold 50% of the shares in Ospreys. Cuddy 
was the nominated director from Neath on the board of Ospreys. Hawkes alleged 
that he suffered unfairly prejudicial conduct by Mr Cuddy because Cuddy put the 
interests of Ospreys above the interests of Neath, who appointed Cuddy to the board 
of Ospreys. In terms of the agreement between Mr Cuddy and Hawkes, when they 
established Neath and then subsequently Neath’s interests in Ospreys, Cuddy was to 
consult with Hawkes on matters concerning Neath.
“In my judgement, the fact that a director of a company has been nominated to that office by a 
shareholder does not, of itself, impose any duty on the director owed to his nominator. The director 
may owe duties to his nominator if he is an employee or officer of the nominator, or by reason of a 
formal or informal agreement with his nominator, but such duties do not arise out of his nomination, 
but out of a separate agreement or office. Such duties cannot however, detract from his duty to the 
company of which he is a director when he is acting as such. The duty, if any, owed by Mr Cuddy 
to Mr Hawkes depended entirely on the agreement between them. There was evidence, referred 
to at paragraph 19 of the judgment, that Mr Cuddy accepted that he was to ‘look after the Region 
and Neath’s interests in the Region’. This is, however, a very vague formulation for a legal duty, 
and particularly so when Mr Cuddy’s overriding duty to Ospreys when acting as a director of that 
company is borne in mind. That duty [to Ospreys] was overriding.”84
It initially appears that the court accepted the corporate primacy approach with the 
above statement. However, the court then states the following:
“In addition, as mentioned above, there was no evidence that the other shareholder of Osprey, i.e. 
Swansea, had agreed to any dilution of Mr Cuddy’s fiduciary duties to the company so as to justify 
his putting the interests of Neath ahead of those of Osprey when making decisions as a director of 
the latter. It would not have been sufficient to show that the other director of Osprey, i.e. Mr Blyth, 
had agreed to such a dilution.”85
The above statement implies that the shareholders of Ospreys could have agreed that 
their directors may put the interests of the individual constituent clubs (Swansea 
Neath respectively) before the interests of Ospreys.86
The Fulham case discussed above also appears to recognise and accept the 
possibility that nominee directors may contractually agree in advance to serve the 
interests of their appointers. There was however a caveat that in the Fulham case 
the undertaking by the directors was given at a stage that it would be in the best 
interest of the subsidiary company. When the development a few years later would 
not be in the interest of the subsidiary company, they were bound by their earlier 
undertaking. The Fulham case is probably not authority for the proposition that a 
director may contractually put the interests of his appointer above the interests of 
the company. The Fulham case dealt with a very specific undertaking given at a time 
when the undertaking was in fact in the interests of the company. Also, the juristic 
act to which the exercise of discretion pertained had been completed at that (much) 
earlier stage, whereas the development project itself was merely a consequence of 
83 (n 62).
84 the Neath case (n 62) par 32, 33 and 35.
85 par 44.
86 Ahern (n 71) 136-137.
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that act. A reading of the Berlei Hestia case shows that the issue dealt more with a 
joint venture and the Neath case’s facts are also very specific. 
This highlights the important difference between a contract concluded between 
an appointor and a director, and one concluded by the company itself (through its 
director/s) with a third. Whether a contractual arrangement which provides that 
directors may act in the interest of their appointers is enforceable is doubtful, even 
if this arrangement is provided for in the memorandum of intent of a company in 
the light of the nature of fiduciary duties of directors. The purpose here is not to 
discuss the contractarian view that the imposition of fiduciary duties is a result 
of bargaining by the contracting parties.87 DeMotte on the other hand argues that 
fiduciary duties stem from equity and that contract law is not an appropriate tool to 
analyse fiduciary duties.88 The fact that duties of directors have also been codified 
to an extent that fiduciary duties now also have a legislative component and that it 
cannot be subject to bargaining, or at least to limited bargaining which is subject to 
acting always in the best interest of the company and not the appointer.
Subsequent to the Australian and New Zealand cases cited above, the respective 
legislatures made amendments to the respective Companies Acts. The Australian 
Corporations Act89 provides in respect of wholly owned subsidiaries that directors 
may prefer the interests of the holding company. The Corporations Act provides that
“A director of a corporation that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a body corporate is taken to act in 
good faith in the best interests of the subsidiary if:
(a)  the constitution of the subsidiary expressly authorises the director to act in the best interests of 
the holding company; and
(b)  the director acts in good faith in the best interests of the holding company; and
(c)   the subsidiary is not insolvent at the time the director acts and does not become insolvent 
because of the director’s act.”90
The Corporations Act has therefore followed commercial reality in acknowledging 
that a director stands in an unenviable position when it comes to exercising his 
discretion where there is a divergence between the interests of the holding company 
and the interests of the subsidiary company. The Australian legislature has however 
only restricted the common law rule that directors owe a duty to their own company 
in the given defined circumstances and subject to the subsidiary being a wholly 
owned subsidiary. There will still be tension for directors where they have to exercise 
their discretion in those situations where the interests of the holding company and 
the interests of the subsidiary clash.
The New Zealand Companies Act91 goes further than the Australian Corporations 
Act. The New Zealand Act provides:
“Duty of directors to act in good faith and in best interests of company
(1) Subject to this section, a director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties, 
must act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the best interests of the company.
(2) A director of a company that is a wholly owned subsidiary may, when exercising powers or 
performing duties as a director, if expressly permitted to do so by the constitution of the company, 
act in a manner which he or she believes is in the best interests of that company’s holding company 
even though it may not be in the best interests of the company.
87 See Ahern (n 71) 138-141 and the authorities discussed there.
88 DeMotte “Beyond metaphor: an analysis of fiduciary obligation” 1988 Duke LJ 879 879-880.
89 Corporations Act 2001.
90 s 187 of the Corporations Act.
91 105 of 1993.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2016 . 4
LIABILITY WITHIN COMPANY GROUPS 725
(3) A director of a company that is a subsidiary (but not a wholly owned subsidiary) may, when 
exercising powers or performing duties as a director, if expressly permitted to do so by the 
constitution of the company and with the prior agreement of the shareholders (other than its holding 
company), act in a manner which he or she believes is in the best interests of that company’s holding 
company even though it may not be in the best interests of the company.
(4) A director of a company that is carrying out a joint venture between the shareholders may, when 
exercising powers or performing duties as a director in connection with the carrying out of the joint 
venture, if expressly permitted to do so by the constitution of the company, act in a manner which 
he or she believes is in the best interests of a shareholder or shareholders, even though it may not be 
in the best interests of the company.”92
Sections 131(3) and 131(4) go further than the Australian equivalent in the 
Corporations Act by extending the boundaries of acting in the interests of the 
holding company. In the defined circumstances a director of a subsidiary may put 
the interests of the holding company above the interests of his own company.
3.2 Directors having to act in the best interest of the company
Where does this leave the South African law? When one considers the Australian 
and New Zealand legislation, which give effect to the commercial realities facing 
nominee directors on the boards of subsidiary companies, and when one considers 
the attempt by the German legislature to partially give effect to this reality but 
simultaneously having a stick in the form of section 311 and section 317 of the AG, 
the question arises as to what end the act could protect a director who serves as 
a nominee of the holding company on the board of the subsidiary company and 
who wants to serve the interests of the holding company above the interests of the 
subsidiary.
Section 76(3)(b) of the act provides that a director of a company must exercise 
his powers in the best interests of the company. Could a director conceivably argue 
that he served the interests of the company where he acts for the benefit of the 
holding company but it appears at face value to be detrimental to the subsidiary 
company? This could probably only be argued in terms of the business judgement 
rule. Section 76(4)(a)(iii) of the act provides that a director will have satisfied his 
duty to act in the best interests of the company if, among other things, he “made a 
decision, or supported the decision of a committee or the board, with regard to that 
matter, and the director had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the 
decision was in the best interests of the company”. Is it possible for a director to 
state that he had a rational basis, and believed that he acted in the best interests off 
the subsidiary company where he followed an instruction from the holding company 
which was advantageous for the holding company but detrimental to the subsidiary 
company? To answer this question the judgment in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede 
Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd,93 which dealt with the question whether the directors acted 
in the best interests of the company, will be tested against analogous case law from 
the Insolvency Act. 
The Visser Sitrus case dealt with the question whether the directors of Goede 
Hoop Sitrus acted in the best interest of the company by refusing to consent to the 
transfer of the shares which Visser Sitrus held in the company to a fellow shareholder, 
Mouton Sitrus. From the facts it appeared that the board was concerned that Mouton 
Sitrus was becoming too powerful and that their increased shareholding would not 
92 s 131.
93 2014 5 SA 179 (WCC).
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be in the interests of the company for various reasons. The court had to therefore 
consider whether the board had a rational basis for believing that, and that it did 
indeed believe, that it was in the best interests of the company to refuse the transfer.
The court stated:
“Section 76(4) makes clear that the duty imposed by s 76(3)(b) to act in the best interests of the 
company is not an objective one, in the sense of entitling a court, if a board decision is challenged, to 
determine what is objectively speaking in the best interests of the company. What is required is that 
the directors, having taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed, should subjectively have 
believed that their decision was in the best interests of the company and this belief must have had 
‘a rational basis’. The subjective test accords with the conventional approach to directors’ duties…”94
The court then further stated: “Section 76 requires the bona fide assessment of the 
directors to have a rational underpinning. This requirement has been articulated less 
frequently in the conventional statement of directors’ duties, but is not necessarily 
an innovation.”95 
The court in the Visser Sitrus case appears to state that the rationality test is 
subjective in nature, yet the analysis of a decision’s rational basis appears far more 
objective in nature. The court uses the principles of administrative law for clarity 
regarding the rationality test, considering specifically the jurisprudence surrounding 
s 6(2)( f )(ii) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and the 
legality principle in this field in general.96 Ultimately, it appears that the application 
of s 76(4) reduces the standard of conduct required for adherence to s 76(3)(b) and 
(c), as rationality is a less onerous standard of conduct than reasonableness.97 The 
implication is that a director’s belief in the confluence of the best interests of the 
appointing and subsidiary entities need not have been one a reasonable director with 
the same knowledge, skill and experience as the director in question would have 
held, but merely one which bears a rational relationship to the basis for that belief. 
Can a belief that acting in the best interest of the holding company or the group is 
also in the best interest of the subsidiary company (despite prima facie detriment to 
that company) have a rational basis?
This section will attempt to draw analogies from the law of insolvency case law 
dealing with allegations that dispositions by a subsidiary to its holding company 
were dispositions without value. The counterargument in the following cases was 
that the subsidiary received value in the form of the financial stability of the group. 
The purpose of the section will therefore be to determine whether the board of the 
subsidiary company could rationally argue that it acted in the best interest of the 
company despite the prima facie detriment.
In Goode, Durrant & Murray Ltd v Hewitt & Cornell NNO98 Fannin J said 
the following about an inter-group cession agreement, which was attacked as a 
disposition without value under the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936:
“In this case, as I have said, the Company is one of a group of companies, and it guaranteed the 
obligation of another member of the same group as a result of financial pressure upon that fellow 
member, and on the parent company. On those facts, it seems to me impossible at this stage to say 
94 the Visser Sitrus case (n 93) par 74. 
95 par 75.
96 par 74. 
97 For a fuller and more detailed discussion of the impact of the Visser Sitrus case and the effect of 
s 76(4), see Stevens and De Beer “The duty of care and skill and reckless trading: remedies in flux?” 
2016 SA Merc LJ 250.
98 1961 4 SA 286 (N).
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that no ‘value’ was given for there are many important benefits which such a transaction might 
bring to the Company, such as, for example, the continued financial stability of the whole group of 
companies.”99
By stating that the value of the transaction was situated in the financial stability of 
the group, the court in effect held that a debtor could show that value in terms of the 
Insolvency Act need not be received by it as the direct beneficiary, but that value 
could be received indirectly through the benefit to the rest of the group.
However, Langeberg Koöperasie Bpk v Inverdoorn Farming & Trading 
Company Ltd,
100 like the Goode, Durrant case, dealt with dispositions in terms 
of the Insolvency Act101 within the context of a group of companies. In this case 
the respondent stood surety for the obligations of its holding company, Standard 
Finance Corporation of South Africa Ltd. Upon the liquidation of the respondent 
the appellant attempted to prove a claim against the respondent. The liquidator 
averred, inter alia, that the grant of the suretyship constituted a disposition without 
value under the Insolvency Act that should be set aside. The appellant relied on the 
judgment in the Goode, Durrant case, namely that the suretyship gave value to the 
group of companies of which the respondent was part.
Beyers JA, in delivering the majority judgment, mentioned that the respondent 
was a member of a group of companies, but that it nevertheless had a personality 
of its own. He further held that when a court has to consider whether a particular 
transaction is or is not in the interests of such a company, it would be prudent to 
bear in mind the remarks of Centlivres CJ in R v Milne and Erleigh,102 namely that:
“There is no persona which is the group, and there are no interests involved except the interests of 
the companies and the interests of the controllers. This is not mere legal technicality. No doubt it 
may be convenient to talk of the interests of the group, but no one could seriously think of the group 
as having interests distinct from those of the companies and controllers. The fact that in a group 
bargaining between companies may often be non-existent, because the controllers decide, does not 
support the idea of a single persona with single interests. No business man would be deceived into 
thinking that in a group there is, in effect, a pooling of assets and a right in the controllers to deal 
with assets belonging to the companies without regard to their respective interests. Those interests 
must be adjusted by the controllers as honest boards would agree to do if there were no group, i.e. on 
fair and reasonable lines, having regard to the circumstances of each transaction.”103
The court a quo in the Langeberg case had held, after observing that the Goode, 
Durrant case was decided on exception, that:
“After considering the evidence and the arguments adduced thereon I can come to only one 
conclusion, and that is that this was an extraordinary transaction by which a farming company 
mortgaged the whole of its assets to assist another company to meet its debts. By undertaking this 
liability the Board achieved nothing beneficial to the Company, the advantage sought was remote 
and illusory, and in the result the Company was impoverished and forced into liquidation. To 
describe the disposition as one for value is to ignore the facts.”104
The appellate division was not persuaded that the findings of the court a quo 
were incorrect. It is important to note, however, that the court held that it was 
99 291.
100 1965 2 SA 597 (A).
101 24 of 1936.
102 1951 1 SA 791 (A).
103 (n 102) 827G-828A as quoted in the Langeberg case (n 100) 606.
104 the Langeberg case (n 100) 607C-D.
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not unmindful of the possible implications of its conclusion upon the general 
acceptability to creditors of bonds over the assets of subsidiary companies, when 
tendered by parent companies as security for the latter’s obligations. The court held 
that if any such bond is attacked as a disposition without value under the Insolvency 
Act, the enquiry must always be whether, on the facts of the particular case, the 
mortgaging subsidiary company can fairly be said to have received value for the 
challenged disposition.
Although the appellate division dismissed the appeal, it would appear that it was 
more due to the facts at hand than the principle before it. It would appear that Beyers 
JA and Williamson JA, who wrote the dissenting judgment, tacitly acknowledged 
that the financial stability of a group of companies may constitute value in terms of 
the Insolvency Act in appropriate circumstances. This seems to imply that the court 
could view a group of companies as an economic unit in appropriate circumstances.
The question of value in the context of voidable dispositions under the Insolvency 
Act was again considered in Swanee’s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (in liquidation) v Trust 
Bank of Africa Ltd.
105 In this decision the court seemingly attempts to qualify the 
judgments in the Goode, Durrant and Langeberg cases but simultaneously does 
not reject the notion that the insolvent may receive value for its disposition within 
the context of a group.106 Value in this context refers to the financial stability of the 
group. This case, however, did not involve a group of companies. The only common 
feature of the companies in this case was that they had the same shareholders, Mr 
and Mrs Swanepoel. Be that as it may, the court still accepted implicitly that it is 
conceivable that the financial stability of a group would constitute value within the 
context of voidable dispositions under the Insolvency Act. The court infers that it 
would be a question of fact by looking at all the surrounding circumstances.107
The problem with analogies is that they have to be understood within context. In 
this respect it is important to remember that the Langeberg, Goode, Durrant and 
Swanee cases all deal with whether value had been given in the specific circum-
stances. In these cases it was approached as an objectively determinable factual 
question, and the subjective intention of the disposer was not important whether the 
disposers intended it to be for the benefit of the group was not crucial to determine 
whether there had been value given. What was important was to determine ex post 
facto whether value had been received. Why these cases are important though is the 
fact that the courts did not reject the arguments of value within the group context, 
but in those cases where it had been rejected it was a question of fact and not of law. 
Thus, would a director of a holding company be in breach of his duty to act in the 
best interest of the company if he follows an instruction from his holding company 
which is harmful but thought it would be in the best interest of the holding company 
but also the subsidiary company? If one also considers the argument of Locke that 
the supreme court of appeal gave a commercially purposive interpretation in the 
CNA case, the argument that the directors may have had a rational basis for believing 
that they acted in the best (longer-term) interest of the company, despite the prima 
facie shorter-term harm, may be a plausible defence for the relevant directors.108
105 1986 2 SA 850 (A).
106 860B-E.
107 860E.
108 See Locke (n 4).
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4 Conclusion
Subsidiary companies could often suffer harm due to the instructions of the holding 
company. This places the directors of subsidiary companies in a dilemma when 
they make decisions because more often than not they have to act in the interest 
of the holding company and to the detriment of the subsidiary company. This is 
the commercial reality within which they operate. The South African law does not 
always recognise this commercial reality. The board of the subsidiary may believe 
that they as nominee directors have to act in the interest of the holding company to 
avoid possible negative consequences. They may also believe that if they follow the 
instructions of the holding company they may act in the long-term best interest of 
the subsidiary company. At the moment the only defence that a director may have 
against a charge that he did not act in the best interest of his company is that he had 
a rational belief that he did. This article therefore investigated whether such belief 
could be justified by considering the dictum in the Visser Sitrus case, and using case 
law in the field of insolvency as an illustration that such group-benefits have indeed 
been judicially recognised in another context. This suggests that, in theory, it would 
be possible for a director to allege a rational basis for a belief in the materialisation 
of such benefits. 
The article further investigated the unenviable position of nominee directors 
within the context of the above conclusions. It is suggested that the legislature takes 
cognisance of the German, Australian and New Zealand Companies Acts, which in 
some form or another recognise the commercial reality within which the nominee 
directors operate. All three systems have attempted to give effect to the commercial 
reality, but also simultaneously attempted to build in sufficient deterrents to avoid 
abuses, especially the German provisions. It has been shown that no clear analogous 
position exists in South African law to adopt the German position but that legislative 
intervention would be needed if, from a policy perspective, liability would be 
imposed on the holding company. In the light of the separate juristic personality 
doctrine, it is doubtful whether the German model would suit South African law. 
The reason for this is its different company law tradition despite the attractive 
nature of the provisions of AG in the context of harmful instructions by the holding 
company. 
SAMEVATTING
AANSPREEKLIKHEID BINNE MAATSKAPPYGROEPE
Een van die grondbeginsels van die maatskappyereg is aparte regspersoonlikheid; ook waar die 
beherende aandeelhouer ’n ander maatskappy is. Maatskappygroepe is kommersiële werklikhede, 
maar tradisioneel erken die reg nie die ekonomiese realiteit van maatskappygroepe nie. Dit is enersyds 
’n kommersiële werklikheid dat houermaatskappye direkteure in sy filiale aanstel en instruksies 
aan daardie direkteure sal gee ten opsigte van die bestuur van die filiaal; instruksies wat dikwels 
nie op die oog af in die beste belang van die filiaalmaatskappy is nie. Andersyds het direkteure van 
die filiaalmaatskappy ’n vertrouensplig teenoor die filiaalmaatskappy en moet in die beste belang 
van die filiaalmaatskappy optree. Direkteure van filiaalmaatskappye bevind hulle dus dikwels in 
die onbenydenswaardige posisie om te moet kies tussen die gehoorsaming van instruksies van hul 
aanstellers en hul vertrouenspligte teenoor die filiaalmaatskappy. 
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die aanspreeklikheid in groepsverband binne die konteks van instruksies 
wat die houer aan die filiaal gee. Die Duitse Aktiengesetz laat in sekere omstandighede toe dat 
instruksies gegee mag word. Indien hierdie omstandighede egter nie teenwoordig is nie, mag die 
houermaatskappy nie nadelige instruksies aan die filiaal gee nie. Indien dit sou, mag die houer of 
sy direksie vir die skade, wat die filiaal ly, aanspreeklik gehou word. Die onderskeie Australiese en 
Nieu-Seelandse maatskappywetgewing laat breedweg toe dat die filiaal se direksie wel in sekere 
gevalle in die belang van die houer optree ten spyte van die nadeel aan die filiaal. Hierdie artikel 
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 4 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
730 STEVENS
ondersoek enersyds die moontlikheid of die houermaatskappy as ’n skadu-direkteur beskou kan word 
en op daardie basis aanspreeklikheid opdoen as analogie tot die Duitse posisie. Tweedens ondersoek 
die artikel of direkteure van die filiaal, wat prima facie nie in die beste belang van die filiaal optree nie, 
wel ’n suksesvolle verweer sou kon opper teen ’n klag dat hulle hul vertrouensplig teenoor die filiaal 
verbreek het. Na aanleiding van die Visser Sitrus-saak blyk dit dat daar wel ’n moontlike suksesvolle 
verweer teen enige klag van ’n vertrouenspligskending geopper sal kan word. 
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